Bridging Continents: The Institutional-Political System of the EU–Mercosur Association

The EU–Mercosur Association Agreement, concluded in principle in 2019 after two decades of negotiation, represents a milestone in interregional diplomacy. Going beyond mere trade liberalisation, it was conceived as a platform for sustainable development, political dialogue, and strategic cooperation between Europe and Latin America. However, while the agreement is ambitious in scope, its institutional-political dimension remains underdeveloped. Unlike other EU association agreements, it does not establish a detailed governance framework capable of sustaining long-term coordination. This paper, indeed, argues that, in order for the partnership to reach its full potential, both the European Union and Mercosur must actively work to bridge the institutional asymmetries that currently hinder meaningful cooperation.

The core of this challenge lies in the structural divergence between the two blocs. The EU operates through a supranational institutional system with strong legal authority, binding rules, and well-established bodies such as the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Court of Justice. Mercosur, on the other hand, is based on an intergovernmental model. Decision-making within Mercosur is highly dependent on consensus among its member states, and its institutions, including the Mercosur Parliament and Permanent Review Tribunal, lack significant enforcement power or political influence. These institutional differences are not merely technical: they reflect contrasting political cultures and visions of regional integration.

While the agreement refers broadly to mechanisms for implementation, it falls short of establishing robust institutional channels for regular oversight, dispute settlement, or joint political coordination. This absence leaves a vacuum in which the complexities of the partnership are reduced to static commitments, rather than dynamic processes of engagement. As it stands, the agreement risks remaining a symbolic accord, rather than becoming the engine of a durable interregional alliance.

From the EU’s perspective, bridging this gap requires a more context-sensitive approach to external governance. Rather than transplanting its institutional model onto Mercosur, the EU should seek to foster adaptable and gradual mechanisms of cooperation. This could involve supporting capacity-building in regional governance, offering technical assistance to strengthen Mercosur’s parliamentary structures, and promoting horizontal dialogue between European and South American legislators. Furthermore, the EU could advocate for mechanisms that encourage progressive regulatory convergence, while acknowledging the diverse political and economic realities across Mercosur member states.

Crucially, the EU should move beyond a purely top-down model of engagement. Embedding civil society participation within the implementation process - through structured consultation of NGOs, labour unions, and academic networks - could enhance transparency and generate local ownership of the agreement. Similarly, increasing the role of parliamentary diplomacy and joint thematic working groups would allow for a more balanced and politically resilient form of cooperation, rooted not only in technocratic negotiations but in democratic exchange.

At the same time, Mercosur bears its share of responsibility. The success of the agreement will depend on Latin America’s ability and willingness to strengthen its own regional institutions. While the principle of state sovereignty remains central, greater coherence at the Mercosur level is essential to match the EU’s institutional readiness. This could mean increasing the political role and visibility of Parlasur, committing to clearer internal procedures for implementing external commitments, and harmonising policies in areas such as environmental standards and labour rights. Without these efforts, Mercosur risks perpetuating an institutional fragility that limits its credibility as a global partner.

Moreover, democratic stability within Mercosur member states remains a critical precondition for a functioning agreement. The EU–Mercosur accord includes “essential elements” clauses on respect for democratic principles and human rights. Any backsliding in these domains could trigger political tensions or even lead to the suspension of parts of the agreement. As such, domestic political developments across the region will have direct implications for the trajectory of the partnership.

Ultimately, the EU–Mercosur Association Agreement is more than a commercial contract: it is a political experiment in twenty-first-century interregionalism. It offers a unique opportunity to build a bridge between two continents with distinct institutional architectures but shared aspirations. If both parties recognise the value of this moment, they can move beyond mere policy coordination toward constructing a hybrid system of governance, one that allows for diversity while building mutual trust, capacity, and accountability.

To do so, they must treat institutional design not as an afterthought but as a foundation. The success of this agreement will depend not only on tariffs and trade balances but on the quality of the political infrastructure they are willing to build together. With strategic patience and creative diplomacy, the EU and Mercosur can transform their agreement from a historic signature into a living, evolving model for global governance.

The bodies behind the agreement

While the agreement’s economic and geopolitical dimensions have attracted considerable attention, its institutional architecture for democratic oversight and civil society participation is less frequently discussed. Three core bodies are designed to foster transparency, accountability, and stakeholder engagement: the Parliamentary Committee (APC), the Domestic Advisory Groups (DAGs), and the Civil Society Forum (CSF). This paper analyses the mandates, compositions, and potential significance of these institutions in shaping the implementation and legitimacy of the EU-Mercosur partnership.

1. The Parliamentary Committee (APC): A Venue for Political Dialogue

The Parliamentary Committee (APC) is a central institutional feature designed to ensure ongoing inter-parliamentary dialogue between the European Union and Mercosur countries. Modeled on similar committees in previous EU association agreements, the APC is composed of members from the European Parliament and the national parliaments of the Mercosur states (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay). Its primary purpose is to provide a forum for the elected representatives of both regions to monitor, debate, and influence the implementation of the agreement.

The APC’s functions are advisory rather than legislative or executive; it may make recommendations to the Association Council (the highest decision-making body of the agreement) and other joint institutions but cannot itself adopt binding decisions. Nonetheless, its value lies in its capacity to enhance transparency and democratic accountability. By holding regular meetings, facilitating exchange of information, and promoting dialogue on issues ranging from trade disputes to environmental standards and human rights, the APC ensures that parliamentary voices are heard in the bi-regional partnership.

Moreover, the APC serves as an important check on the executive branches of both parties, which may otherwise dominate the implementation phase. Its composition allows for the inclusion of a diversity of political perspectives and the possibility to raise issues that reflect public concerns. In this sense, the APC plays a symbolic and practical role in ensuring that the association agreement remains subject to political scrutiny and debate, contributing to its long-term legitimacy.

2. Domestic Advisory Groups (DAGs): Structured Civil Society Consultation

The Domestic Advisory Groups (DAGs) represent another innovative institutional mechanism for stakeholder involvement. Established on both the EU and Mercosur sides, DAGs are composed of representatives from employers’ organizations, trade unions, environmental groups, and other relevant civil society actors. Their mandate is to monitor and provide advice on the implementation of the trade and sustainable development (TSD) chapter of the agreement, which covers labor rights, environmental protection, and related issues.

DAGs are intended to ensure that a wide array of non-state voices are systematically consulted on matters of social and environmental relevance. Their members meet regularly to review progress, discuss challenges, and prepare recommendations for submission to the relevant joint bodies of the agreement. Unlike ad hoc consultations, DAGs are permanent and institutionalized, with a right to access information and channels for dialogue with policymakers.

The effectiveness of DAGs depends heavily on their independence, representativeness, and resources. In other agreements, such as the EU–South Korea FTA, DAGs have sometimes faced criticism for being under-resourced or insufficiently diverse. For the EU-Mercosur Agreement, much will depend on the political will of governments to ensure that DAGs function as genuine platforms for critical dialogue rather than as box-ticking exercises. If empowered, DAGs can be a critical link between civil society and official decision-making, enhancing both the substance and perceived legitimacy of the TSD provisions.

3. The Civil Society Forum (CSF): A Platform for Transnational Engagement

The Civil Society Forum (CSF) complements the DAGs by providing a transnational platform for broader civil society dialogue between the EU and Mercosur. Unlike DAGs, which operate at the national or regional level, the CSF brings together civil society organizations from both regions to discuss the overall implementation of the agreement, with particular attention to the TSD chapter.

The CSF’s main objectives are to foster mutual understanding, share best practices, and discuss the social, economic, and environmental impacts of the agreement. Its meetings are open to a diverse range of stakeholders, including NGOs, business associations, academic institutions, and other interested parties. This inclusiveness is key to ensuring that the forum reflects a broad spectrum of interests and expertise.

While the CSF does not have formal decision-making power, it can influence the policy process by providing recommendations and raising concerns directly to the relevant authorities. Its very existence is intended to create a culture of openness and accountability, making it more difficult for sensitive issues - such as environmental degradation, labor abuses, or human rights concerns - to be ignored.

However, for the CSF to be effective, it must be more than a mere “talking shop.” It requires meaningful access to information, real opportunities to engage with decision-makers, and the capacity to hold them accountable. Experiences from other EU agreements show that the impact of such forums varies considerably depending on the resources allocated and the seriousness with which authorities treat their input.

Conclusion

The institutional framework for oversight and participation in the EU-Mercosur Association Agreement reflects a growing recognition that complex international agreements require more than intergovernmental negotiation - they need continuous scrutiny by parliaments and civil society. The APC, DAGs, and CSF each offer unique but complementary channels for democratic oversight and stakeholder engagement. Their effectiveness will ultimately depend on political will, adequate resourcing, and the extent to which their recommendations are taken seriously by those in power.

If implemented with ambition, these bodies can help address legitimate concerns about transparency, social and environmental standards, and the broader legitimacy of the EU-Mercosur partnership. If not, they risk becoming symbolic gestures. Thus, much of the future of EU-Mercosur cooperation will be shaped not just by what is agreed on paper, but by how these institutions function in practice.